Examining the reasons why individuals choose to participate or comply with certain fishing regulations is a key part of successful fisheries management. This paper presents a case study that evaluates fisher perceptions of multiple recreational fishery regulations, including traditionally used methods of bag and size limits and a novel regulation involving quota leasing, in the for-hire (i.e., charter) recreational fishing sector for Pacific halibut (Hippoglossus stenolepis) in Alaska. This study examined responses from open-ended and Likert-scale questions from semi-structured interviews with 45 charter operators in Homer and Sitka. Our results highlight that controls on individual harvest can be perceived to have unintended consequences for charter businesses, such as effects on profitability and distance traveled.
Introduction
As harvests in marine recreational fishing have increased in magnitude in the U.S. over the last few decades [1] , scholars have explored ways to reduce the environmental impact of recreational fishing [2, 3] . Currently, the tools available for managing recreational fisheries focus primarily on the angler. Some place restrictions on individual anglers, such as daily catch limits, possession limits, and size limits, and others focus on the entire sector, such as where, when, and how fish can be caught. However, as the effectiveness of these methods to restrict recreational catch have been increasingly scrutinized, it has become evident that while individual harvest controls limit individual catch, they do not effectively limit total recreational harvest because there are no limits on licenses or effort (i.e., number of participants) [4] . To control total recreational harvests, tools affecting sector-wide effort and catch have emerged, such as quota allocation, and limits on the total number of licenses issued.
While traditional harvest control tools have been at the core of managing recreational fishing, research shows that success of fishing regulations largely depends on fisher compliance [5] [6] [7] . Lack of compliance can affect the efficacy and outcomes of fisheries regulations [8] [9] [10] . Examining the reasons why individuals choose to participate in recreational fisheries or comply with certain fishing regulations, including social dynamics and perceptions of management, is a key part of successful fisheries management [11] [12] [13] [14] . Understanding the human dimensions of recreational fisheries, such as fisher behavior, motivations, and attitudes, allows managers to better anticipate responses to regulations and to design regulations that are more likely to receive support from stakeholders [15] , while still achieving desired objectives.
For guided fishing businesses, perceptions of regulations by captains can play an important role in how regulations and fishing advisories are transmitted to recreational anglers [16] . Therefore, captains of fishing businesses have the potential to affect angler compliance on a large scale. This paper presents a case study that evaluates charter captains' perceptions of multiple recreational fishery regulations, including traditionally used methods of harvest controls and a novel regulation involving quota leasing, in the for-hire (i.e., charter) sector for Pacific halibut (Hippoglossus stenolepis) in Alaska. Charter fishing is a popular activity in Alaska and an important source of revenue for businesses in tourism-focused coastal communities. Pacific halibut (hereafter referred to as halibut) is the most harvested bottomfish in the charter sector, comprising 47% of bottomfish harvest in 2014 [17] . Controls on the charter sector were established in 1975 (two-fish bag limit with no size limit) [18] , which remained unchanged for over 30 years until 2007 in Southeast Alaska and 2014 in Southcentral Alaska [19, 20] . Concerns over the growth of the charter sector have led to the implementation of additional restraints on charter fishing effort, including a limited entry program in 2011 (75 Federal Register 554) and an assortment of measures starting in 2014 in the form of trip limits, a closure of one or more days per week, and voluntary quota leasing [21] . However, with the exception of an analysis of the voluntary leasing program [22] , there has been little research on the perceptions and support of these recent management measures by the charter industry.
The objective of this study was to examine charter operators' perceptions of traditional and novel recreational fishery management tools in two communities: Homer, Alaska, and Sitka, Alaska. It was hypothesized that perceived impacts of regulations on charter captains and their businesses would differ between Homer and Sitka, due to differences in their social, economic, regulatory, and ecological characteristics. Homer is located in the Southcentral region of Alaska and is on the Alaska road system. It is accessible to much of the state, including the Anchorage metropolitan area, the largest population center in Alaska (2016 U.S. census population estimates; www.census.gov). Sitka, by comparison, is located on Baranof Island, in the Southeast region of Alaska, and is accessible only by plane or boat. The Southcentral region attracts more Alaska resident angler effort (26% of charter angler-days fished by residents in 2014) compared to the Southeast region (3% charter angler-days fished by residents in 2014) [17] . In addition to differences in their customer base, Sitka and Homer also differ in the variety of species available, the types of trips offered to customers (e.g., Pacific halibut-only vs. multispecies), and their histories of regulation [23] . How these differences set the context for understanding charter operators' perceptions of recent regulatory changes is discussed below. Ultimately, the research reported here highlights the importance of understanding the political and historical context of local fishery systems and provides a deeper examination of the possible impacts of regulations on charter businesses. These perceived impacts and, more importantly, the perceived fairness of the regulatory process that caused them, can ultimately affect levels of compliance.
Management of the charter halibut sector in Alaska
Management of Pacific halibut occurs at the international, federal, and state levels. At the international level, halibut is jointly governed between the United States and Canada through the International Pacific Halibut Commission (IPHC), which conducts annual stock assessments and sets an overall catch limit and apportions it among ten regulatory areas, one in the U.S. Pacific Northwest, one encompassing the coast of British Columbia, and eight in waters off Alaska. In addition, the IPHC establishes seasons, minimum size limits for commercial fisheries, and other annual management measures [24] . Each nation is responsible for ensuring that the sum of directed catches (commercial, sport, and subsistence), incidental catch, and discard mortality is no greater than the limit set by the IPHC. Under the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (U.S. Public Law 94-265), authority to allocate Pacific halibut catch among fishing sectors devolves to the North Pacific Fishery Management Council (NPFMC), subject to consistency with national standards and other applicable federal law. Responsibility for reviewing NPFMC decisions, implementing management measures, monitoring catches, and enforcing regulations falls to the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS). At the state level, the Alaska Department of Fish and Game (ADF&G) administers license programs for sport fishers and sportfishing guides, oversees a logbook program that is required for charter vessels, conducts creel surveys, and manages an annual statewide harvest survey of sport anglers in Alaska.
Halibut catch in the Alaskan charter fishery is influenced, primarily, through size limits, gear restrictions, and bag and possession limits. Even though catch restrictions are common recreational fishing management tools, they alone cannot restrict sector-wide harvests without accompanying constraints on participation [25] . This challenge has been observed in Alaska's charter sector; as charter halibut harvest increased in Alaska throughout the early 2000s [21] , there was also a 14% increase in the number of saltwater-guide businesses in Alaska, from 847 in 1999 to 917 in 2006 [26, 27] . In an attempt to control charter sector growth, the NPFMC established the Charter Halibut Limited Access Program in 2011 to limit the number of charter vessels permitted to offer charter trips for halibut in Southeast and Southcentral Alaska [28] . This program issued a fixed number of federal Charter Halibut Permits (CHP) to charter operators and/or businesses based on historical participation as a charter operator during a set of qualifying years. In 2014, the Guided Angler Fish (GAF) program was introduced, which allows for temporary one-way leasing of commercial individual fishery quota (IFQ) for use by charter businesses, including self-transfers for charter operators who also own IFQ (78 Federal Register 75843). The GAF program is dependent on willing participation from the commercial sector, which has been managed under IFQs since 1995 [29] . A charter operator participating in the GAF program leases IFQ from a commercial fisher and during that charter season, can designate a customer who can harvest halibut up to non-charter sport bag and size limits (i.e., two fish daily bag limit with no size restrictions) (50 CFR 300.65) [22] . While the charter operator pays an upfront cost to the commercial fisher to lease IFQ, this cost is typically passed on to the charter customer who harvests under the more liberal GAF guidelines. In 2014, the first year of the program approximately 18.6 metric tons of IFQ were leased, equating to around 2000 fish [30] , but only 1069 fish were actually harvested [31] .
Participation in the GAF program has been relatively limited by charter businesses since its inception in 2014 (7% of the unique 564 CHP holders participated in 2016; Scheurer, Charter Halibut Permits List https://alaskafisheries.noaa.gov/permits-licenses) [32] . A 2015 mail survey conducted by NOAA and sent to all CHP holders (response rate of 48%) found that the most frequently cited reasons for not participating in the GAF program during 2014 were that "leasing GAF was too expensive" (46% of participants) and "did not support the GAF program" (45% of participants) [22] . In Southeast Alaska, "leasing GAF was too expensive" was the most frequently cited reason (50% of Southeast respondents) for not participating [22] . In 2016, the average cost per GAF halibut was $197 in Southcentral and $353 in Southeast [32] . In Southcentral Alaska, "did not support the GAF program" was the most frequently cited reason (52% of Southcentral respondents) for not participating [22] . These survey results, combined with consistent low participation, suggest that along with issues of cost, there is substantial charter opposition to the GAF program. While the NOAA survey showed a general lack of support amongst charter businesses and captains, it was not designed to identify why they did not support the GAF program. This research, among other topics, fills this gap by identifying the key reasons for low charter participation in and resistance to the GAF program.
Materials and methods
Semi-structured, in-person interviews [33] were conducted with charter operators in Homer (May and June of 2015) and Sitka (May and June of 2014 and 2015). Participants were initially solicited through newsletter announcements distributed by four charter associations (Alaska Charter Association, Homer Charter Association, Southeast Alaska Guides Organization, and Sitka Charter Boat Operators Association). Additionally, introduction letters were mailed in spring 2014 to 2014 CHP holders with their CHP address listed in Sitka, AK. In spring 2014, introduction letters were mailed to 2014 CHP holders with their CHP address listed in Sitka, AK. Introduction letters included a one-page summary of the research project, anticipated travel dates to Sitka or Homer, and researcher contact information.
Additional participants were identified using snowball sampling, in which participants are invited to suggest individuals to participate [33] . All participants were active charter operators at the time of the interview (i.e., captain of a charter vessel and/or a charter business owner). Interviews attempted to capture a broad diversity of views that could shed light on the varied ways that people are experiencing regulation changes [34] , but did not attempt to assess the extent to which these views are represented among charter operators as a whole. Participants were asked to volunteer for interviews and were not provided incentives for participating. The project received approval from the Institutional Review Board through the University of Alaska Fairbanks (#583323).
Charter operators' views of how regulations have affected their fishing businesses were examined through two types of questions. Survey questions using a Likert-scale were used to assess perceptions of individual harvest controls that directly target charter fishing behavior (e.g., changes to bag limits, restrictions on number of charter trips per day). Open-ended questions were used to assess perceptions of sectorwide controls with broad ranging effects on charter businesses. These two sets of questions are described in greater detail below.
To examine individual harvest controls, two regulations in each region implemented in the last five years were selected. These regulations were selected based on conversations with charter operators, charter organizations, and managers during the project development phases and were identified as having substantial impacts on charter businesses in each local region. In Sitka, participants were asked about the effects of 1) a decrease in bag limit in 2009, and 2) a change from a maximum size limit to a reverse slot limit in 2012. In Homer, participants were asked about 1) the implementation of a vessel trip limit in 2014, and 2) the establishment of a size limit in 2014. Participants were asked to answer Likert-scale questions on the effects of a particular regulation on their charter business (Appendix 1). For example, a participant was asked whether that regulation decreased, had no effect, or increased the distance he or she traveled on an average trip. Likert-scale responses were summarized using the package 'likert' [35] in R (Rx64, version 2.15.2, http://www.R-project.org/).
To evaluate effects of sector-wide regulations, open-ended questions were used to ask about charter operators' perceptions of the effects of the CHP and GAF programs on their businesses. Responses to each question were transcribed and analyzed for themes in ATLAS.ti 8.0 (2002-2017, ATLAS.ti Scientific Software Development GmbH) [36] . The analysis was inductive, meaning that concepts were coded as they were encountered, and no a priori coding dictionary was used. Quotes from interview participants are presented throughout the paper to provide context for the coded themes. In some cases, spelling, spacing, and punctuation were standardized for ease of reading. Every effort was made to maintain the meaning conveyed by participants.
Results
A total of 18 charter operators were interviewed in Homer and 27 in Sitka. Based on charter logbook data collected by the Alaska Department of Fish and Game (ADF&G), 107 and 141 saltwater vessels offloaded charter bottomfish (i.e., halibut, lingcod, rockfish, sablefish, or shark) in Homer and Sitka, respectively in 2014 [17] . Each respondent owned or operated one or more vessels in 2014; therefore, the Homer respondents account for a minimum of 17% and the Sitka respondents 19% of the charter vessels that offloaded bottomfish in 2014. Participants from Sitka and Homer differed in their years of experience as a charter operator, age, and residency (Table 1) . On average, Homer participants were older with more years of charter experience as compared to Sitka participants ( Table 1 ). The vast majority of the Homer participants (94%) reside in Alaska, while 62% of the Sitka participants reside full-time in the state. Over 85% of participants in each study location responded to Likert-scale questions (Table 2 ).
Perceptions of individual harvest controls
In Southeast Alaska, a 2009 rule shifted charter halibut regulations from a two-fish bag limit with one less than 32 in., to a one-fish bag limit with no size restrictions [19] . A majority of Sitka participants (58%) reported that this regulation increased the distance they traveled on an average charter trip, while 42% indicated no effect; no participants reported a decrease in the distance traveled following the change (Fig. 1 ). This reduction in bag limit in Southeast Alaska was also perceived by 48% of Sitka participants to decrease the profitability of their fishing business, with 52% reporting no effect and no participants reporting an increase (Fig. 2) . Sitka participants largely viewed the bag limit reduction as having no effect on the number of unguided recreational anglers fishing in their areas (Fig. 3) .
The second regulation assessed was a 2012 regulation, which changed halibut limits in Southeast Alaska from one fish less than 37 in. Table 2 The number of interviewees who responded to Likert-scale questions on the effects of regulation changes on the distance traveled to fishing grounds, profitability, and the number of unguided recreational anglers.
Number of responses to Likert-scale questions Fig. 1 . Interviewee responses to a Likert-scale question on the impact of a regulation on the distance traveled. Interviewees were asked to choose whether a regulation decreased, had no effect, or increased their distance traveled on an average charter trip. Interviewees were asked to respond only for regulations specific to their region.
to a reverse slot limit of one fish that could either be ≤ 45 in. or ≥ 68 in. This regulation liberalized the maximum size limit of halibut from 37 to 45 in. and added a larger size class of halibut that could be retained. In other words, this regulation created a size class of halibut that cannot be retained (46-67 in.). The majority of Sitka participants (60%) reported that this regulation increased the distance they traveled on an average trip, while 8% reported a decrease and 32% perceived no effect (Fig. 1 ). This change in the size limit was also perceived by 35% of Sitka participants to increase the profitability of their fishing business, with 48% reporting no effect and 17% participants reporting a decrease (Fig. 2) . As with the bag limit reduction, most Sitka participants indicated that the change in size limit had no effect on the number of unguided recreational anglers fishing in their areas (Fig. 3) . The first regulation assessed for Homer was a 2014 regulation that limited a charter vessel to one charter halibut trip per calendar day. Previously, the number of charter trips per day had not been restricted and Homer-area businesses primarily offered a choice of half-day and full-day trips [23] . At the height of the season, businesses operating half-day trips were able to schedule two trips per day (e.g., morning and afternoon). For businesses that were operating two half-day trips per day, this regulation was perceived to reduce their business revenue substantially. This regulation specifically affected businesses operating half-day trips, with little effect on those who operated full-day trips. The majority of Homer participants viewed this regulation as having no effect on the distance they travel to fish (75%, Fig. 1) , the profitability of their business (56%, Fig. 2 ), or the number of unguided anglers fishing in their areas (59%, Fig. 3 ). However, with regard to the trip limit, the 38% reported that their profitability had decreased (Fig. 2) and 41% indicated that the number of unguided anglers had increased (Fig. 3) .
In Southcentral Alaska, a 2014 regulation was implemented that established a size limit for the second allowable fish. Specifically, the regulations changed from a two-fish bag limit with no size restrictions to a two-fish bag limit with a maximum size of 29 in. for one of the retained fish. Homer interviewees were divided on the effects of this regulation on the distance they travel on an average trip, with 25% reporting a decrease, 38% reporting an increase, and 38% reporting no effect (Fig. 1) . A slight majority (59%) indicated that the regulation had a negative effect on the profitability of their businesses, while 41% reported no effect (Fig. 2) . Most Homer participants perceived that the introduction of a size limit on the second fish increased the number of unguided recreational anglers who fish in the same areas (75%; Fig. 3 ).
The Charter Halibut Permit (CHP) program
The CHP program limited the number of charter boats in the charter halibut sector in both study locations. From the analysis of open-ended questions, the most common theme regarding the effects of the CHP program was that it had "no effect on me or my business" (41%). Other effects reported included "decreased the number of charter operators" (22% of interviewees), "overall negative effect on me or my business" (14%), and "the limited entry program was inequitable" (14%). The sampling frame in this study consisted of charter operators active in the charter business in 2014 or 2015 and did not include charter operators who did not qualify for a permit, were unable to purchase a permit, or who do not target halibut; therefore, perceptions of the limited access program documented here are biased towards operators who qualified for a permit or had the ability to purchase a permit.
Although the majority of interviewees commented that the limited access program had no effect, some interviewees shared their frustration with the CHP program, namely, that the qualifying process did not properly address extenuating circumstances and that the cost of entry into the sector increased after the CHP program was implemented. As a charter operator said, I think they are [CHPs] going for like, $20,000 now. That's a huge deterrent…there are so many expenses…The cost for entry in this business is a barrier in itself especially when the economy's down. Even if the young guys like me who are all about conservation and we want to help save the fishery, we can't even get in the business… because it just costs too much.
Guided Angler Fish (GAF)
The GAF program allows charter operators to lease commercial halibut IFQ for use by charter clients, up to unguided sport halibut limits. About half (53%) of the interviewees discussed concerns of inequity related to the GAF program. Other common themes were: "no effect on me or my business" (25%), and "overall negative effect on me or my business" (22%). Perceptions of inequity centered on several themes, including lack of consultation with the charter sector and unfair distribution of benefits and costs. Specifically, 31% of interviewees commented that the GAF program favors the commercial sector, in particular because of the perception that benefits of the program were accrued more towards commercial sector. As a charter operator said, I refuse to participate in it [GAF]. There's no way I'm going to commingle sport fishing with commercial fishing…I would be aiding and abetting commercial fishermen to sit home and do nothing and make a lot of money off it and I refuse. Fig. 2 . Interviewee responses to a Likert-scale question on the impact of a regulation on profitability. Interviewees were asked to choose whether a regulation decreased, had no effect, or increased the profitability of their fishing business. Interviewees were asked to respond only for regulations specific to their region. Fig. 3 . Interviewee responses to a Likert-scale question on the impact of a regulation on unguided recreational anglers. Interviewees were asked to choose whether a regulation decreased, had no effect, or increased the number of unguided recreational anglers in their charter fishing locations. Interviewees were asked to respond only for regulations specific to their region.
Some interviewees in the current study indicated a lack of support for the GAF program because they do not believe that commercial fishing for halibut should have transitioned to catch shares in the first place. For example, one charter operator said, I just disagree with it [commercial halibut IFQs] on general principle and I won't have anything to do with it. I won't buy a GAF fish… I think it's an insult to the charter sector.
A quarter of interviewees reported that the GAF program has no effect, and 22% reported an overall negative effect. Interviewees who perceived no effect from GAF were simply not planning on participating in the program and did not see how the program could be beneficial or detrimental to their charter business. Interviewees who noted an overall negative effect from GAF were primarily concerned that the charter businesses who participate in GAF would be more competitive than businesses without GAF. Specifically, interviewees mentioned that charter operators who already possessed commercial fishing quota would benefit from the GAF program because of the ability to self-lease (i.e., lease from your commercial halibut quota to your charter business). A charter operator said, It won't allow me to grow my business if I wanted to, it puts me at a decided disadvantage with sport fishing charter companies that already own commercial fishing quota. I think that's the biggest complaint with a lot of charter boat owners, we're not fortunate enough to have quota, so we can't GAF, because it's pretty cost prohibitive.
Discussion
Charter captains perceived the effects of fishing restrictions in different ways. A majority of respondents in Sitka perceived specific bag and size limit changes to increase their distance traveled on an average trip (58% and 60%, respectively). This aligns with previous findings that Sitka captains expanded their fishing areas over time due to changes in halibut regulations [23] . One possible explanation for this result is that tighter limits may lead anglers to seek fish of the allowable sizes in new areas, particularly if there is spatial heterogeneity in the size structure of the target species. Most Homer interviewees perceived that the 2014 size limit increased the number of unguided recreational anglers in their fishing locations and decreased the profitability of their businesses (75% and 59%, respectively). Previous research found that restricting the size of the second fish in a two-fish bag limit could still maintain economic value for charter trips in Alaska [37] . However, results from this research suggest that there could be indirect effects of the charter size limit on the number of unguided recreational anglers when no size limits are placed on non-charter halibut. As a charter operator explained, We go out and put the anchor down and there could be 50 boats parked around us. The increase in the number of small boats in Alaska, especially on the Kenai Peninsula and Anchorage…has tremendously increased.
Charter captains suggested this had resulted, in part, from resident anglers shifting from charter fishing to fishing on private boats (e.g., "bare-boat charters," or vessels offered for daily lease to anglers). While this study did not seek to corroborate charter operators' perceptions with independent data, these results show that charter operators consider regulations targeted at their fishing behavior to have broader impacts on the profitability of their businesses and potential competition for space with unguided anglers. This study did not aim to capture proportional responses within the entire charter fleet, rather this study examines the different ways that policy changes influence fisher behavior, and in many cases, to show that the responses are not uniform across the fleets. For example, while some people experienced longer travel distances due to trip and size limit regulations in Homer, others found that their trip distances shortened. This illustrates the complex set of circumstances within which regulation changes are experienced.
Understanding the governance structure and representation within governing bodies is important for interpreting charter perceptions of the GAF program and other regulations. The decision-making body at NPFMC consists of 11 voting members, the NMFS regional administrator and ten members nominated by the governors of Alaska (6), Washington (3), and Oregon (1); non-voting members include representatives of various federal departments and agencies (U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Department of State, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and Pacific States Marine Fisheries Commission) [38] . As specified in regulation, the NPFMC includes four voting members who represent federal or state government: the NMFS Alaska Region Administrator (or designee), the Alaska Department of Fish and Game Commissioner (or designee), the Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife (or designee), and the Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife Commissioner (or designee). While often perceived as being focused on commercial fisheries, these government officials oversee commercial, sport, subsistence, and treaty fisheries within their respective jurisdictions. For the last decade, one of the seven appointed NPFMC members selfidentified as representing recreational fisheries with the six remaining appointees self-identifying as representing commercial interests or "other" interests [39] [40] [41] [42] [43] . In a 2016 report to Congress, the U.S. Department of Commerce specifically encouraged governors to nominate to the NPFMC representatives from the recreational sector and the "other" sector (e.g., academics, scientists) [40] . Approximately one third of the interviewees commented that the GAF program favors the commercial sector. As one operator said, I would absolutely never, ever, ever, ever buy any GAF fish…The reason that thing all went through is because the [NPFMC] is all made up of commercial fishing interest people. There's nobody on our side there. No matter how much you say to them, how many letters you write. That's not catch sharing.
Thus, the composition of NPFMC membership likely plays a substantial role in how charter operators view governing bodies such as the NPFMC and IPHC. NPFMC voting members are all either direct political appointees or are nominated by governors of the relevant states and appointed by the Secretary of Commerce. Therefore, the lack of recreational sector representation on the NPFMC is a function of appointments to the NPFMC. Sector membership in Regional Fishery Management Councils in some other parts of the U.S. includes more recreational representation than the NPFMC [40] . For example, the 2016 composition of the Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council consisted of four members representing the recreational fishing sector, four members representing the commercial fishing sector, and three other members [40] . While the NPFMC has made considerable efforts to more fully include stakeholder input, such as establishment of the Charter Halibut Management Committee [44] , members of the NPFMC are still heavily skewed towards commercial sector interests [40] .
In addition to increasing recreational fishing sector representation on management bodies, management could be made more inclusive by explicitly recognizing the diverse nature of recreational fisheries [15, 45] . Novel approaches designed to manage recreational fisheries include quota programs for charter fishing [46] , increased stakeholder participation through angling organizations [47] , and a policy approach in Australia that explicitly includes all sectors in the management process [48] . In 2015, the U.S. Gulf of Mexico red snapper (Lutjanus campechanus) recreational sector was formally split between the private angling component and the Federal for-hire component, resulting in separate quotas and seasons between the two components (80 Federal Register 22422). Additionally, the Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council is currently exploring alternative management measures for the Federal for-hire component including establishment of an IFQ program [49] . Catch share programs specific to recreational sectors have been explored in the U.S. [50] and Australia [51] . For Pacific halibut, programs aimed at reallocating quota between commercial and recreational sectors have been implemented in Canada [52] and through the GAF program in the U.S. [31] .
Since its inception, the GAF program has seen low participation and a lack of support from the charter industry. A previous study found that the high cost of participation was the most frequently cited reason that charter operators did not use GAF in 2014 and 45% of respondents "did not support the GAF program [22] ." The lack of support for GAF could be related to perceptions that the program is disadvantageous to the charter sector relative to the commercial sector. In the current study, half of the interviewees perceived that the GAF program was inequitable. For example, a charter operator said:
It's crazy to lease from a commercial guy what was given to him. It's immoral. Why should I have to lease some of it when it was given to you? It's not yours to own, it's our resource.
The GAF program symbolizes decades of conflicts between the commercial and charter fishing sector in Alaska stemming, in part, from the implementation of catch shares in the commercial halibut sector [29] , which allocated IFQ based on historical participation in the commercial halibut fishery.
Conflicts between different fishing sectors have been documented worldwide [53] [54] [55] [56] . For example, Harrison and Loring [57] found that in conflicts surrounding Alaska's Upper Cook Inlet salmon fisheries, commercial, sport, and personal use fishers felt their rights were not being sufficiently protected and that existing laws are not being fully enforced. However, the conflicting sectors actually shared a majority of values [57] . In 2016, the North Pacific Fishery Management Council approved the creation of a non-profit charter halibut recreational quota entity (RQE) that would be eligible to purchase commercial halibut quota to use in the charter sector [58] . The RQE program is similar to the GAF program in that it would allow transfer of commercial halibut quota to the charter sector, though RQE transfers would add to the entire charter sector allocation, rather than be for the benefit of individual charter anglers. However, not only does the GAF program currently have low charter participation but, the GAF program evoked strong sentiments about inequities in this project. In the context of the GAF and RQE programs, these programs can only function when there are willing sellers and buyers; therefore, understanding perspectives in both sectors is equally important.
To reduce conflict between sectors, it is important that stakeholder groups perceive management agencies as unbiased and independent [59] . For example, the Western Australia Integrated Fisheries Management policy, adopted in 2004, addresses how fishery resources can be equitably allocated through setting harvest levels for each resource, using an independent allocation committee process [51] . The Australian model has created a policy framework in which management has shifted from a blame game with high levels of conflict between sectors to one where all sectors are focused on sustainability of the resource first and then identifying sectoral allocation [51] . Although the Australian example is not perfect, it does specifically address the need to structure a management framework to reduce conflict between user groups. Perceived inequities that have not been fully addressed can shape stakeholders' perceptions of current management institutions and affect compliance. Research on factors of non-compliance in artisanal fisheries highlight the importance of understanding the local community, such as identifying the preferred mode of communication and being cognizant of the social norms within a community [60] . Fisheries management agencies can use participatory research to better understand local concerns of fishing communities while fostering cooperation and collaboration [61] . Understanding the historical and political contexts of fishery systems can help managers better anticipate support for future management approaches.
